Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks
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- Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1995.
"Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 105-130, September.
- R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1994. "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 4704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luigi Zingales, 2000.
"In Search of New Foundations,"
NBER Working Papers
7706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael J. & Wall, Larry D., 1996. "Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 331-350, March.
- John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony & Senbet, Lemma W, 2000.
"A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 95-125.
- Kose John & Anthony Saunders & Lemma W. Senbet, 1996. "A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 96-30, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- Kose John & Anthony Saunders & Lemma W. Senbet, 1998. "A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-043, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- de Meza, David & Southey, Clive, 1999. "Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C126-39, March.
- Hirshleifer, David & Suh, Yoon, 1992. "Risk, managerial effort, and project choice," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 308-345, September.
- Crawford, Anthony J & Ezzell, John R & Miles, James A, 1995. "Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 231-56, April.
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