Pay at the executive suite: How do US banks compensate their top management teams?
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- Ang, James & Lauterbach, Beni & Schreiber, Ben Z., 2000. "Pay at the Executive Suite: How do U.S. Banks Compensate their Top Management Teams?," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt9kp0t5q9, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
- Eufinger, Christian & Gill, Andrej, 2013. "Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: Pay structures as a regulatory signal," SAFE Working Paper Series 9, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
- Ahmed Ayadi & Sami Hammami, 2016. "Efficiency Measurement and Determinants of the Public Transport Industry in Tunisia," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 7(2), pages 613-629, June.
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[The impact of the presence of audit committees on the financial performance of Tunisian compan," MPRA Paper 42175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ahmed AYADI, 2014. "Impact of the governance system efficiency on the performance of the regional transport companies in Tunisia," E3 Journal of Business Management and Economics., E3 Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 039-051.
- Karima Bouaiss & Christine Marsal, 2009. "Les mécanismes internes de gouvernance dans les banques:un état de l'art," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 93-126, March.
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- Eufinger, Christian & Gill, Andrej, 2016. "Incentive-based capital requirements," SAFE Working Paper Series 9 [rev.], Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
- João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
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"L’impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière des entreprises Tunisiennes
[The impact of the Board of directors on the financial performance of Tunisian companies]," MPRA Paper 38672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ayyaz AHMAD* & Saima SARWAR* & M. Wasif SIDDIQI*, 2016. "Impact of CEOs Pay Disparity on Stability of Banks: Evidence from Pakistan," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 26(1), pages 53-76.
- Bai, Gang & Elyasiani, Elyas, 2013. "Bank stability and managerial compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 799-813.
- Michaela Rankin, 2010. "Structure and Level of Remuneration Across the Top Executive Team," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 20(3), pages 241-255, September.
- Anderson, Christopher W. & Becher, David A. & Campbell, Terry II, 2004. "Bank mergers, the market for bank CEOs, and managerial incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 6-27, January.
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