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Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Huberto M. Ennis
  • H. S. Malek

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File URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2005/spring/pdf/ennismalek.pdf
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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Quarterly.

Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): Spr ()
Pages: 21-44

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2005:i:spr:p:21-44:n:v.91no.2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.richmondfed.org/

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Keywords: Banks and banking;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2001. "Regulating bank capital structure to control risk," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 35-52.
  2. Robert L. Hetzel, 1991. "Too big to fail : origins, consequences, and outlook," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Nov, pages 3-15.
  3. Berger, Allen N. & Mester, Loretta J., 2003. "Explaining the dramatic changes in performance of US banks: technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 57-95, January.
  4. Alan Greenspan, 2000. "Banking evolution," Proceedings 662, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  5. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  6. Penas, Maria Fabiana & Unal, Haluk, 2004. "Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 149-179, October.
  7. John R. Walter, 2004. "Closing troubled banks : how the process works," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 51-68.
  8. Huberto M. Ennis, 2001. "On the size distribution of banks," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-25.
  9. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. " Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
  10. Wheelock, David C. & Wilson, Paul W., 2001. "New evidence on returns to scale and product mix among U.S. commercial banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 653-674, June.
  11. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 1-14.
  12. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1997. "FDICIA after Five Years," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 139-158, Summer.
  13. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
  14. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester & Choon-Geol Moon, 2000. "Are Scale Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive?," Departmental Working Papers 200004, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:

  1. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2013. "How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35, February.
  2. Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2013. "Too Big to Manage? Two Book Reviews," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 143-162.
  3. Viral V. Acharya & Thomas Cooley & Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter, 2011. "Market Failures and Regulatory Failures : Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises," Governance Working Papers 23273, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  4. Louzis, Dimitrios P. & Vouldis, Angelos T. & Metaxas, Vasilios L., 2012. "Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1012-1027.
  5. Robert DeYoung & Douglas Evanoff & Philip Molyneux, 2009. "Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institutions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 87-110, December.
  6. Jorge Guillén, 2009. "A lesson to learn from developed countries: The Case of State Branching Deregulation in the US," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 36(1 Year 20), pages 67-95, June.
  7. Phil Molyneux & Klaus Schaeck & Tim Zhou, 2011. "‘Too Systemically Important to Fail’ in Banking," Working Papers 11011, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
  8. Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2007. "How much would banks be willing to pay to become "too-big-to-fail" and to capture other benefits?," Research Working Paper RWP 07-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  9. DeYoung, Robert & Kowalik, Michal & Reidhill, Jack, 2013. "A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 612-627.
  10. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2009. "Does banks size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2009,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  11. Cubillas, Elena & Fernández, Ana I. & González, Francisco, 2017. "How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 46-67.
  12. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2005. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail?," NBER Working Papers 11814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Koetter, Michael, 2006. "The stability of efficiency rankings when risk-preferences and objectives are different," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2006,08, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  14. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2011. "Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-210, March.
  15. Moutsianas, Konstantinos A. & Kosmidou, Kyriaki, 2016. "Bank earnings volatility in the UK: Does size matter? A comparison between commercial and investment banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 137-150.
  16. Kanas, Angelos, 2014. "Default risk and equity prices in the U.S. banking sector: Regime switching effects of regulatory changes," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 244-258.
  17. Molyneux, Philip & Schaeck, Klaus & Zhou, Tim Mi, 2014. "‘Too systemically important to fail’ in banking – Evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(PB), pages 258-282.
  18. Bruno Martins & Ricardo Schechtman, 2013. "Too Rich to Let Me Fail?," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 13, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.

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