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Citations for "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium"

by Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton

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  1. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2011. "Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the Evolution of Societies," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000148, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Young, H. Peyton, 2009. "Learning by trial and error," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 626-643, March.
  3. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000547, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2012. "Conflict and the evolution of societies," Working Papers 2012-032, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  6. John H. Nachbar, 2005. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, 03.
  7. Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
  9. Thomas Norman, 2006. "Learning to Forgive," Economics Series Working Papers 296, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2006. "The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures," Discussion Paper Series dp419, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  11. Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton, 2012. "Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 882-897.
  12. Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins, 2010. "Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1233, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  13. Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-30, CIRANO.
  14. Gordon Menzies & Daniel John Zizzo, 2004. "Inferential Expectations," Economics Series Working Papers 187, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  15. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 304, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2006. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 286-303, November.
  17. Yakov Babichenko, 2010. "Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp529, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  18. J. Jordan, 2009. "Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 115-135, April.
  19. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  20. Joseph E Harrington Jr & Joe Chen, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," Economics Working Paper Archive 514, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Sep 2004.
  21. Vivaldo M. Mendes & Diana A. Mendes & Orlando Gomes, 2008. "Learning to Play Nash in Deterministic Uncoupled Dynamics," Working Papers Series 1 ercwp1808, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
  22. Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay, 2010. "How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 107-126, May.
  23. Timothy Salmon, 2004. "Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 367-404, 04.
  24. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine.
  25. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000692, David K. Levine.
  26. Leslie, David S. & Collins, E.J., 2006. "Generalised weakened fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 285-298, August.
  27. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2013. "Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 289-306.
  28. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2002. "Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp299, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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