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Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games

  • J. Jordan

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-009-0074-y
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 115-135

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:115-135
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    1. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181, March.
    2. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
    3. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    4. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2006. "The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001299, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Kenneth Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1973. "The Informational Size of Message Spaces," Discussion Papers 3, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
    7. Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    8. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    9. Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1983. "On the Existence of a Locally Stable Dynamic Process With a Statically Minimal Message Space," Discussion Papers 550, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Jordan, J. S., 1983. "Locally stable price mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 235-259, July.
    11. Saari, Donald G & Simon, Carl P, 1978. "Effective Price Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1097-1125, September.
    12. Reichelstein, Stefan & Reiter, Stanley, 1988. "Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 661-92, May.
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