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Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics

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  • Foster, Dean P.
  • Hart, Sergiu

Abstract

We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games—“smooth calibrated learning”—in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).

Suggested Citation

  • Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu, 2018. "Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 271-293.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:271-293
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sergiu Hart, 2013. "Adaptive Heuristics," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 11, pages 253-287, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 3, pages 47-76, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Foster, Dean P., 1999. "A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 73-78, October.
    4. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October.
    5. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics And Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 8, pages 165-189, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2015. "Markets, correlation, and regret-matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 42-58.
    7. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
    8. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. , P. & , Peyton, 2006. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 341-367, September.
    10. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead To Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 7, pages 153-163, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Sergiu Hart, 2013. "Nash Equilibrium And Dynamics," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 12, pages 289-293, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Germano, Fabrizio & Lugosi, Gabor, 2007. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July.
    14. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
    15. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8408, August.
    16. Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
    17. Young, H. Peyton, 2009. "Learning by trial and error," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 626-643, March.
    18. Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2009. "Approachability with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 995-1004, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023. ""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    2. Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2021. "Forecast Hedging and Calibration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(12), pages 3447-3490.
    3. Natalie Collina & Aaron Roth & Han Shao, 2023. "Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents," Papers 2311.07754, arXiv.org.
    4. Varun Gupta & Christopher Jung & Georgy Noarov & Mallesh M. Pai & Aaron Roth, 2021. "Online Multivalid Learning: Means, Moments, and Prediction Intervals," Papers 2101.01739, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Calibration; Nash dynamics; Fixed points; Deterministic calibration; Smooth calibration; Finite recall;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General

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