Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.022
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- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. "Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics," Papers 2210.07152, arXiv.org.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp371, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 174, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 783, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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"Markets, correlation, and regret-matching,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 42-58.
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- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013.
"Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead To Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 7, pages 153-163,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
- Sergiu Hart, 2013.
"Nash Equilibrium And Dynamics,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 12, pages 289-293,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Sergiu Hart, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp490, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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"Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July.
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- Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023.
""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. ""Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game," Papers 2209.04892, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2021.
"Forecast Hedging and Calibration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(12), pages 3447-3490.
- Sergiu Hart & Dean P. Foster, 2019. "Forecast-Hedging and Calibration," Discussion Paper Series dp731, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. "Forecast Hedging and Calibration," Papers 2210.07169, arXiv.org.
- Natalie Collina & Aaron Roth & Han Shao, 2023. "Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents," Papers 2311.07754, arXiv.org.
- Varun Gupta & Christopher Jung & Georgy Noarov & Mallesh M. Pai & Aaron Roth, 2021. "Online Multivalid Learning: Means, Moments, and Prediction Intervals," Papers 2101.01739, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
Keywords
Calibration; Nash dynamics; Fixed points; Deterministic calibration; Smooth calibration; Finite recall;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
Statistics
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