A Proof of Calibration Via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem
Over the past few years many proofs of calibration have been presented (Foster and Vohra (1991, 1997), Hart (1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1995), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)). Does the literature really need one more? Probably not, but this algorithim for being calibrated is particularly simple and doesn't require a matrix inversion. Further the proof follows directly from Blackwell's approachability theorem. For these reasons it might be useful in the class room.
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- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996.
"A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium,"
Economics Working Papers
200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 572, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"An Easier Way to Calibrate,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 131-137, October.
- D. Blackwell, 2010. "An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 466, David K. Levine.
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