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Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games

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  • Timothy Salmon

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Abstract

Evidence presented in Salmon (2001; Econometrica 69(6) 1597) indicates that typical tests to identify learning behavior in experiments involving normal form games possess little power to reject incorrect models. This paper begins by presenting results from an experiment designed to gather alternative data to overcome this problem. The results from these experiments indicate support for a learning-to-learn or rule learning hypothesis in which subjects change their decision rule over time. These results are then used to construct an adaptive learning model which is intended to mimic more accurately the behavior observed. The final section of the paper presents results from a simple simulation based analysis comparing the performance of this adaptive learning model with that of several standard decision rules in reproducing the choice patterns observed in the experiment. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Salmon, 2004. "Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 367-404, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:4:p:367-404
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-8736-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-004-8736-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
    2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    3. Martin Posch, 1997. "Win Stay---Lose Shift: An Elementary Learning Rule for Normal Form Games," Research in Economics 97-06-056e, Santa Fe Institute.
    4. Dean Foster & Peyton Young, "undated". "Learning with Hazy Beliefs," ELSE working papers 023, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    5. Shachat, Jason & Walker, Mark, 2004. "Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 280-309, February.
    6. Dale O. Stahl, 1999. "Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 111-130.
    7. Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2003. "Heterogeneity and Learning Principles," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000435, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Teck H Ho & Colin Camerer & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003. "Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000514, David K. Levine.

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