Learning to Forgive
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References listed on IDEAS
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991.
"On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
More about this item
KeywordsRepeated Games; Folk Theorem; Learning; Hypothesis Testing; Equilibrium Selection;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2007-04-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-04-14 (Game Theory)
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