## Citations for "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements"

### by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine

- Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993.
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**Global Games and Equilibrium Selection**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.

- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990.
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**Global Games And Equilibrium Selection**," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research. - Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993.
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**Global Games and Equilibrium Selection**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine. - Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990.
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**Global games and equilibrium selection**," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. - Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993.
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**Global games and equilibrium selection**," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990.
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- Robson, A.J., 1990.
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**An "informationally robust equilibrium" for two-person nonzero-sum games**," Discussion Paper 1990-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

- Robson~ Arthur J., 1994.
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**An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 233-245, September.

- Robson, A.J., 1990.
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**An "Informationally Robust Equilibrium" For Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games**," Papers 9039, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.

- Robson~ Arthur J., 1994.
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- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999.
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine.

- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.

- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. - Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. - Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. - Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999.
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**Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv. - Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999.
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**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.

- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
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- Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007.
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**Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors**," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics.

- Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010.
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**Robust equilibria under non-common priors**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.

- Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005.
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**Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors**," MPRA Paper 14287, University Library of Munich, Germany. - Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2010.
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**Robust equilibria under non-common priors**," Post-Print halshs-00754466, HAL.

- Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010.
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- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995.
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**Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.

- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989.
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**Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.

- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987.
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**Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player**," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. - D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989.
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**Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.

- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989.
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- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005.
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**Refinements of Nash Equilibrium**," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. - Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015.
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**Epistemic Game Theory**," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier. - Kevin D. Cotter, 1987.
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**Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information**," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. - Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012.
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**A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597. - D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999.
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**A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types**," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University. - Perea Andrés, 2003.
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**Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games**," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR). - Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004.
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**Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine. - Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995.
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**A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction**," Discussion Paper Serie B 331, University of Bonn, Germany.

- Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997.
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**A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction**," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.

- Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997.
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- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, .
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**The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information**," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.

- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
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**The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.

- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, .
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**"The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''**," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.

- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
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- Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf, 2015.
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**Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 56-71. - Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006.
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**Superstition and Rational Learning**," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.

- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006.
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**Superstition and Rational Learning**," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.

- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005.
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**Superstition and Rational Learning**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000731, David K. Levine. - Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006.
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**Superstition and Rational Learning**," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.

- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006.
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- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992.
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**Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed**," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.

- Fudenberg, D., 1991.
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**Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed**," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. - D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999.
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**Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.

- Fudenberg, D., 1991.
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- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007.
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**Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.

- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009.
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**Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.

- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009.
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**Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique**," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.

- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009.
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- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012.
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**Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations**," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.

- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
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**Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations**," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.

- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
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**Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations**," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00812781, HAL.

- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
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- Varoufakis, Yanis, 2013.
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**Finite dynamic games with full rationality and inconsistently aligned beliefs: Can the N-person backward induction deliver a solution?**," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 3(1), pages 63-70. - Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007.
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**Impact of higher-order uncertainty**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.

- Muhamet Yildiz & Jonathan Weinsten, 2004.
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**Impact of higher-order uncertainty**," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 157, Econometric Society.

- Muhamet Yildiz & Jonathan Weinsten, 2004.
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- Francesco Squintani, 1999.
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**Games with Small Forgetfulness**," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. - Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007.
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**Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty**," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December. - Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016.
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**Whither Game Theory?**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine. - Alexander Funcke & Daniel Cownden, 2015.
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**A Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement of Coordination: Sidestepping Theory of Mind**," PPE Working Papers 0003, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania. - Larry Samuelson, 2004.
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**Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis**," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June. - repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
- Takashi Kunimoto, 2006.
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**The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium**," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics. - Klement, Alon, 2003.
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**Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information**," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September. - Sexton, Richard J., 1993.
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**Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets**," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center. - Sexton, Richard J., 1991.
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**Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets**," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. - Marco Celentani, 2001.
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**Essays on Reputation**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine. - Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997.
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**Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June. - Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003.
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**A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types**," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. - Ken Binmore, .
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**Rationality and Backward Induction**," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. - Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
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**Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey**," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. - D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000.
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**Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games**," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University. - Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011.
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**The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts**," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.

- Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011.
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**The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts**," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.

- Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011.
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- Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001.
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**Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge**," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. - Kyle Bagwell, 1992.
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**Commitment and Observability in Games**," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

- Bagwell, Kyle, 1995.
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**Commitment and observability in games**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.

- Bagwell, Kyle, 1995.
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- Marco Celentani, 1991.
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**Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games**," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics. - Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001.
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**Implementation with Near-Complete Information**," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003.
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**Implementation with Near-Complete Information**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.

- Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003.
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- Ken Binmore, .
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**Backward Induction and Common Knowledge**," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. - Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997.
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**On Rationalizability in Extensive Games**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. - Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2011.
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**Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs**," Working Papers 1326, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.. - Perea Andrés, 2003.
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**Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games**," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).