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On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  2. Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
  3. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  5. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  6. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
  7. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  8. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
  9. Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty Of Payoffs," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 57-67, March.
  10. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  11. Varoufakis, Yanis, 2013. "Finite dynamic games with full rationality and inconsistently aligned beliefs: Can the N-person backward induction deliver a solution?," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 3(1), pages 63-70.
  12. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  13. Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
  14. Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf, 2015. "Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 56-71.
  15. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, September.
  16. van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Signaling and forward induction in a market entry context," Discussion Paper 1989-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  17. Zhijun Chen & Chongwoo Choe & Noriaki Matsushima, 2020. "Competitive Personalized Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 4003-4023, September.
  18. Shuo Liu & Harry Pei, 2017. "Monotone equilibria in signalling games," ECON - Working Papers 252, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  19. , & ,, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  20. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  22. Robson~ Arthur J., 1994. "An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 233-245, September.
  23. Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan & Sun, Yang, 2022. "A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  24. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  26. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  27. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  28. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  29. David Hirshleifer & Chong Huang & Siew Hong Teoh, 2017. "Index Investing and Asset Pricing under Information Asymmetry and Ambiguity Aversion," NBER Working Papers 24143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  31. Nathan Canen & Kyungchul Song, 2021. "Counterfactual analysis under partial identification using locally robust refinement," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 416-436, June.
  32. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  33. Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Discussion Paper 1992-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  34. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  35. Skyrms, Brian & Bell, Gary D. & Woodruff, Peter, 1999. "Theories of counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals in contexts of strategic interaction," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 275-291, September.
  36. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  37. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  38. Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Other publications TiSEM 36cc87ee-3c13-4e91-85e0-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  39. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  40. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  41. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, May.
  42. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
  43. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  44. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  45. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  46. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & David Lagziel, 2022. "Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(1), pages 91-119, February.
  47. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 7-34, January.
  48. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
  49. Marlats, Chantal, 2019. "Perturbed finitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 39-46.
  50. Sean P. Sullivan, 2016. "Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 497-525.
  51. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem," Papers 2006.16206, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
  52. Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
  53. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  54. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  55. Wagner, Peter A., 2018. "Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
  56. Marek Mikolaj Kaminski, 2019. "Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-25, August.
  57. Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
  58. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  59. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
  60. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  61. Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  62. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  63. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  64. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2003. "Proper rationalizability and belief revision in dynamic games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  65. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  66. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2014. "The robust selection of rationalizability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 448-475.
  67. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  68. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  69. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 485-504.
  70. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  71. Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  72. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  73. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.
  74. Alexander Funcke & Daniel Cownden, 2015. "A Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement of Coordination: Sidestepping Theory of Mind," PPE Working Papers 0003, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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