IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/aoz/wpaper/362.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability

Author

Listed:
  • David Levine

    (Royal Holloway University of London)

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    (UTDT-CONICET)

  • Felipe Zurita

    (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

Does the ability of the electorate to replace corrupt politicians deter corruption? This paper analyzes the limitations of electoral accountability. Weshow that if the electorate cannot commit elections offer no defense against corruption. However, when a commitment technology exists, the electoratecan strategically choose to remove only those caught taking bribes. This incentivizes corrupt politicians to pass up bribe opportunities for which the valueis small. We then examine how improved monitoring can impact outcomes and show that increasing information quality does not always benefit the electorate.

Suggested Citation

  • David Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2025. "Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability," Working Papers 362, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:362
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/362.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Laura Inés D Amato (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/redniar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.