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Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability

Author

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  • David Levine

    (Royal Holloway University of London)

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    (UTDT-CONICET)

  • Felipe Zurita

    (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

Does the ability of the electorate to replace corrupt politicians deter corruption? This paper analyzes the limitations of electoral accountability. Weshow that if the electorate cannot commit elections offer no defense against corruption. However, when a commitment technology exists, the electoratecan strategically choose to remove only those caught taking bribes. This incentivizes corrupt politicians to pass up bribe opportunities for which the valueis small. We then examine how improved monitoring can impact outcomes and show that increasing information quality does not always benefit the electorate.

Suggested Citation

  • David Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2025. "Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability," Working Papers 362, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:362
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/362.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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