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Arm's length relationships without moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Crémer, Jacques

Abstract

I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.

Suggested Citation

  • Crémer, Jacques, 2009. "Arm's length relationships without moral hazard," IDEI Working Papers 585, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:21623
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    File URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/cremer_j/arms.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Milgrom., 1987. "Adverse Selection without Hidden Information," Economics Working Papers 8742, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    3. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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