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Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for Us States

Author

Listed:
  • James E. Alt

    (Harvard University, jalt@iq.harvard.edu)

  • Robert C. Lowry

    (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences at the University of Texas at Dallas, robert.lowry@utdallas.edu)

Abstract

Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions about how transparency affects voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents and acceptance of higher taxes. We review two models and investigate empirical implications derived from or related to them, using panel data from 1972—2000 for U.S. state budget process transparency, gubernatorial elections, and tax increases in a small structural model. We do not find that budget transparency has a direct effect on incumbent retention, but we do find clear evidence that increased transparency dampens the negative effect of tax increases on retention of incumbent governors. Independent of this, we also find that increased transparency leads to greater fiscal scale. We suggest some possible directions for future models based on our results.

Suggested Citation

  • James E. Alt & Robert C. Lowry, 2010. "Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for Us States," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 379-406, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:379-406
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629810375641
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Sáez-Martín & Antonio M. López-Hernandez & Carmen Caba-Perez, 2017. "Access to public information: a scientometric study of legal versus voluntary transparency in the public sector," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 113(3), pages 1697-1720, December.
    2. Hyungon Kim & Chang Kwon, 2015. "The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 228-253, April.
    3. Violeta Maria CIMPOERU, 2015. "BUDGET TRANSPARENCY - SUPPORTING FACTOR IN THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS AND CONTROL OF CORRUPTION Abstract : In the last two decades, international institutions, donors, acad," EcoForum, "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration - Economy, Business Administration and Tourism Department., vol. 4(Special I), pages 1-37, august.
    4. de Renzio, Paolo & Wehner, Joachim, 2017. "The impacts of fiscal openness," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 82521, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Alex Hathaway & Carolyn Bourdeaux & Emily Franklin, 2019. "Fiscal Transparency and Accountability," Center for State and Local Finance Working Paper Series cslf1912, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Nancy W. Hudspeth & David F. Merriman & Richard F. Dye & Andrew W. Crosby, 2015. "Do Troubled Times Invite Cloudy Budget Reporting? The Determinants of General Fund Expenditure Share in U.S. States," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 68-89, December.
    7. Williams, Andrew, 2015. "A global index of information transparency and accountability," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 804-824.
    8. Victoria Perez, 2018. "Does capitated managed care affect budget predictability? Evidence from Medicaid programs," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 123-152, June.
    9. Wagner, Aiko & Giebler, Heiko, 2014. "It's the responsibility, stupid! Determinanten der Verantwortlichkeitszuschreibung zwischen Europäischer Union und nationaler Regierung für die wirtschaftliche Lage," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 8(Sonderhef), pages 123-142.
    10. Wehner, Joachim & de Renzio, Paolo, 2013. "Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 96-108.

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