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Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil

Author

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  • Taylor C. Boas
  • F. Daniel Hidalgo
  • Marcus André Melo

Abstract

We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own mayor. Partnering with the State Accounts Court of Pernambuco, we conducted a field experiment during the 2016 municipal elections in which the treatment group received information about official wrongdoing by their mayor. The treatment has no effect on self‐reported voting behavior after the election, yet when informing about malfeasance in the context of a vignette experiment, we are able to replicate the strong negative effect found in prior studies. We argue that voters' behavior in the abstract reflects the comparatively strong norm against corruption in Brazil. Yet on Election Day, their behavior is constrained by factors such as attitudes toward local political dynasties and the greater salience of more pressing concerns like employment and health services.

Suggested Citation

  • Taylor C. Boas & F. Daniel Hidalgo & Marcus André Melo, 2019. "Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(2), pages 385-400, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:63:y:2019:i:2:p:385-400
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12413
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    Cited by:

    1. Gianmarco Daniele & Tommaso Giommoni, 2019. "Corruption under Austerity," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19131, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Andrew Delios & Edmund J. Malesky & Shu Yu & Griffin Riddler, 2024. "Methodological errors in corruption research: Recommendations for future research," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 55(2), pages 235-251, March.
    3. Hout, Wil & Wagner, Natascha & Demena, Binyam A., 2022. "Does accountability enhance service delivery? Assessment of a local scorecard initiative in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    4. Shuguang Jiang & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022. "Dishonesty in Developing Countries -What Can We Learn From Experiments?," Working Papers hal-03899654, HAL.
    5. Raphael Bruce & Alexsandros Cavgias & Luis Meloni & Mario Remigio, 2021. "Under Pressure: Women's Leadership During the COVID-19 Crisis," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2021_19, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    6. Bruce, Raphael & Cavgias, Alexsandros & Meloni, Luis & Remígio, Mário, 2022. "Under pressure: Women’s leadership during the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    7. Caryn Peiffer & Grant W Walton, 2022. "Getting the (right) message across: How to encourage citizens to report corruption," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 40(5), September.
    8. Ritwik Banerjee & Amadou Boly & Robert Gillanders, 2022. "Is corruption distasteful or just another cost of doing business?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 33-51, January.
    9. Alrababah, Ala & Casalis, Marine & Masterson, Daniel & Hangartner, Dominik & Wehrli, & Weinstein, Jeremy, 2023. "Reducing Attrition in Phone-based Panel Surveys: A Web Application to Facilitate Best Practices and Semi-Automate Survey Workflow," OSF Preprints gyz3h, Center for Open Science.
    10. de C. Griebeler, Marcelo & R. da Silva, Alexandre, 2020. "Signaling honesty: institutional strength and voters' concern about corruption in a model of electoral competition," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 74(3), September.
    11. Helena Arruda & Rudi Rocha, 2024. "Political Turnover and Fatal Government Transitions," Working Papers 19, Instituto de Estudos para Políticas de Saúde.
    12. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2020. "Collective Reputation and Learning in Political Agency Problems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1110, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Rubén Poblete Cazenave, 2021. "Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-049/V, Tinbergen Institute.

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