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Voting age, information experiments, and political engagement: Evidence from a general election

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  • Keefer, Philip
  • Vlaicu, Razvan

Abstract

This paper addresses voter incentives for political engagement in developing countries, using self-collected experimental and quasi-experimental survey data. Does voting eligibility create intrinsic incentives to become engaged and informed, or do voters remain rationally ignorant and apathetic? What motivations underlie political interest? Are voters knowledgeable about policy issues debated during election campaigns? To address these questions, we fielded a survey of high school seniors across thirty Mexican campuses a few weeks prior to a major general election. Age-based regression discontinuity indicates that the just-eligible measure higher on political motivation and actions than the just-ineligible. One survey experiment shows that information about the potential magnitude of the youth vote increases eligible respondents’ political interest in ways consistent with social incentives. In the second experiment, information about current policy challenges affects eligible respondents’ policy priorities less than the ineligible, reflecting eligibles’ pre-existing knowledge about salient policy issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Keefer, Philip & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2025. "Voting age, information experiments, and political engagement: Evidence from a general election," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:174:y:2025:i:c:s0304387825000094
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103458
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    1. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    2. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2021. "Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1105-1134.
    3. Stiers, Dieter & Hooghe, Marc & Dassonneville, Ruth, 2021. "Voting at 16: Does lowering the voting age lead to more political engagement? Evidence from a quasi-experiment in the city of Ghent (Belgium)," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 849-856, October.
    4. Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon & Renata Rizzi, 2014. "A Test for the Rational Ignorance Hypothesis: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 380-398, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voter engagement; Age discontinuity; Social incentives; Policy knowledge;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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