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Citations for "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements"

by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine

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  1. Alexander Funcke & Daniel Cownden, 2015. "A Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement of Coordination: Sidestepping Theory of Mind," PPE Working Papers 0003, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
  4. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 561-79, July.
  8. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  11. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  13. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  15. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Robson, A.J., 1990. "An "Informationally Robust Equilibrium" For Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games," Papers 9039, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  17. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  18. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  19. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  20. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  21. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  22. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.
  23. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
  24. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  25. Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995. "A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
  26. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  27. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  28. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  29. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. Ken Binmore, . "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  31. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics.
  32. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  33. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  34. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  35. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  36. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  37. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  38. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  39. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  40. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  41. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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