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Citations for "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements"

by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  2. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
  4. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  6. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  7. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Robson, A.J., 1990. "An "informationally robust equilibrium" for two-person nonzero-sum games," Discussion Paper 1990-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Kevin D. Cotter, 1987. "Convergence of Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 709, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  12. Chen, Yi-Chun, 2012. "A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 587-597.
  13. Alexander Funcke & Daniel Cownden, 2015. "A Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement of Coordination: Sidestepping Theory of Mind," PPE Working Papers 0003, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  14. Ken Binmore, . "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  15. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  17. Marco Celentani, 2001. "Essays on Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000176, David K. Levine.
  18. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  19. Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. repec:dgr:kubcen:199224 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  22. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  23. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  24. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  25. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  26. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, M. & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, 1997. "Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 269-276, June.
  27. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
  28. Klement, Alon, 2003. "Threats to sue and cost divisibility under asymmetric information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 261-272, September.
  29. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  30. repec:dgr:kubcen:198957 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  32. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  33. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1324, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  34. Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
  35. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  36. repec:hrv:faseco:4729511 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  38. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  39. repec:dgr:kubcen:199052 is not listed on IDEAS
  40. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  41. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  42. Marco Celentani, 1991. "Reputation With Deterministic Stage Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 636, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.