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Size and persistence matter: Wage and employment insurance at the micro level

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  • Kerndler, Martin

Abstract

Firms provide substantial insurance against wage fl uctuations and job loss. This paper studies how the interaction between shock size and persistence affects the firm's ability to insure workers against idiosyncratic firm-level shocks. Using linked employer-employee data from Germany, I find that wages respond largely symmetrically to positive and negative permanent shocks. Whereas transitory shocks lead to upward wage rigidity. Individual layoff probabilities only increase in response to negative permanent shocks. Interestingly, wage cuts and job loss after negative shocks are limited to blue-collar workers. Whereas white-collar workers are fully insured against negative shocks both in terms of wages and employment.

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  • Kerndler, Martin, 2019. "Size and persistence matter: Wage and employment insurance at the micro level," ECON WPS - Vienna University of Technology Working Papers in Economic Theory and Policy 04/2019, Vienna University of Technology, Institute for Mathematical Methods in Economics, Research Group Economics (ECON).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuweco:042019
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Kerndler & Michael Reiter, 2020. "Wage Rigidities and Old-Age Unemployment," EconPol Policy Brief 22, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    wage insurance; layoffs; linked employer-employee data; Kalman filter;

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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