Shareholder Wealth and Wages: Evidence for White-Collar Workers
We present empirical evidence on the relationship between individual wages, conditional on worker characteristics, and equity returns using a unique survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Equity returns affect the wages only of workers with three or more years of tenure. A 4 percent increase in a firm's market value raises pay by 0.3 percent within three years. Our estimates suggest that each $10 increase in shareholder wealth raises the present value of a firm's wage bill by $1. The elasticity of white-collar wages with respect to equity returns is one-third smaller than the CEO salary elasticities in our sample.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holmlund, B. & Zetterberg, J., 1989.
"Insider Effects In Wage Determination: Evidence From Five Countries,"
1989a, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Holmlund, Bertil & Zetterberg, Johnny, 1991. "Insider effects in wage determination : Evidence from five countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1009-1034, July.
- Currie, Janet & McConnell, Sheena, 1992.
"Firm-Specific Determinants of the Real Wage,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 74(2), pages 297-304, May.
- David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Peter Sanfey, 1992.
"Wages, Profits and Rent-Sharing,"
NBER Working Papers
4222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990.
"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
- Hildreth, Andrew K G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1997.
"Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and Establishment Panels,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 318-337, April.
- Hildreth, Andrew K G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1994. "Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and Establishment Panels," Economics Discussion Papers 10024, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Hilderth, A.K. & Oswald, A.J., 1993. "Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence form Company and Establishment Panels," Economics Series Working Papers 99154, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Nickell, Stephen & Wadhwani, Sushil B, 1989.
"Insider Forces and Wage Determination,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
310, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nickell, S. & Wadhwani, S., 1989. "Insider Forces And Wage Determination," Economics Series Working Papers 9972, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Nickell, S. & Wadhwani, S., 1989. "Insider Forces And Wage Determination," Papers 334, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
- Hausman, Jerry A, 1978.
"Specification Tests in Econometrics,"
Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-1271, November.
- Nickell, Stephen & Kong, Paul, 1992. "An investigation into the power of insiders in wage determination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1573-1599, December.
- Steven G. Allen, 1995. "Updated Notes on the Interindustry Wage Structure, 1890â€“1990," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 48(2), pages 305-321, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:328-354. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.