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Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes : Evidence from linked employer-employee data

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Rusinek

    () (Université Libre de Bruxelles, DULBEA)

  • François Rycx

    () (National Bank of Belgium, Research Department
    Université Libre de Bruxelles, DULBEA
    IZA Bonn)

Abstract

In many European countries, the majority of workers have their wage rates determined directly by industry-level agreements. For some workers, industry agreements are supplemented by firm-specific agreements. Yet, the relative importance of individual company and industry agreements (in other words, the degree of centralisation) differs drastically across industries. The authors of this paper use unique linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in Belgium to examine how these bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralised than in centralised industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. Moreover, in centralised industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by a company agreement. The findings of this paper finally suggest that, within decentralised industries, both firm-specific and industry-wide bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Rusinek & François Rycx, 2008. "Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes : Evidence from linked employer-employee data," Working Paper Research 152, National Bank of Belgium.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbb:reswpp:200812-1
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    Keywords

    Rent-sharing; collective bargaining; propensity score matching.;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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