The dynamics in requested and granted loan terms when bank and borrower interact repeatedly
This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts are firm age and size at the time of the first interaction between borrower and bank. Over loan sequences, credit constraints decease most pronouncedly in the beginning of relationships and for the initially young and small firms. Moreover, the structure of the dataset allows me to disentangle the demand and supply effects behind these observed credit constraints. I find that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases because both sides converge. If previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately, while granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. The findings are a sign of the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information problems when contracting repeatedly with opaque borrowers. The results further suggest that, particularly in the beginning of a bank relationship, borrowers learn from their previous experience with credit constraints and adjust their demand accordingly.
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- Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998.
"Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
9809, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 557-75, October.
- Ortiz-Molina, H. & Penas, M.F., 2004.
"Lending to Small Businesses : The Role of Loan Maturity in Adressing Information Problems,"
2004-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hernán Ortiz-Molina & María Penas, 2008. "Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 361-383, April.
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