How stressed are banks in the interbank market?
We use a unique data set that comprises each bank's bids in the Eurosystem's main refinancing operations and its recourse to the LOLR facility (a) to derive banks' willingness-to-pay for liquidity through a one-week repo and (b) to show that a bank's willingness-to-pay is a good indicator for the probability that this bank draws on the LOLR facility. Our results suggest (i) that banks' willingness-to-pay for liquidity indeed reflects refinancing conditions in the interbank market and (ii) that the willingness-to-pay can serve as an early warning indicator for banking distress.
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