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Pourquoi faut-il séparer les activités bancaires ?

  • Jean-Paul Pollin

    (Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans)

  • Jean-Luc Gaffard

    (OFCE)

C’est au niveau européen que se situe la dernière chance d’une réforme structurelle des systèmes bancaires, c’est-à-dire d’une séparation entre les activités de banque d’investissement et celles de banque commerciale. A en croire la profession bancaire et certains milieux académiques, cette séparation est au mieux inutile et au pire dommageable. Il serait illusoire de vouloir séparer les activités risquées des activités non risquées, les activités non spéculatives des activités spéculatives. Toute activité bancaire est risquée, sinon spéculative. Après tout, la crise des subprime aux Etats-Unis, la crise des caisses d’épargne en Espagne, la crise de la Northern Rock en Grande-Bretagne résultent de risques inconsidérés pris dans l’octroi de crédits immobiliers aux ménages (...).

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Date of creation: 19 Nov 2013
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Publication status: Published in Les notes du blog, 2013, pp.1-8
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1cud3763momrc7c9o91o4g581
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