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Will the new stability and growth pact succeed? An economic and political perspective

  • Marco Buti
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    While the Maastricht Treaty establishes the entry conditions for Member States to join the single currency, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aims to make budgetary discipline a permanent feature of EMU. Consequently, the Pact is commonly interpreted as a major building block of EMU's architecture: the SGP ‘must rank as one of the most remarkable pieces of policy coordination in world history. The purpose of this paper is to offer an initial evaluation of the SGP reform. Section Two reviews the main fiscal policy developments in the early years of EMU which were at the basis of the crisis of the SGP ‘mark I'. Section Three describes the reformed SGP and an assessment of its main features. Section Four presents some reflections on the political economy of the EU rules, comparing the new SGP with the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP ‘mark I'. The final section concludes.

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    File URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication841_en.pdf
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    Paper provided by Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission in its series European Economy - Economic Papers with number 241.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0241
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    1. von Hagen, Jürgen & Wolff, Guntram B., 2004. "What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,38, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
    2. Gábor Orbán & György Szapáry, 2004. "The Stability and Growth Pact from the Perspective of the New Member States," MNB Working Papers 2004/4, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).
    3. Marco Buti & Jo�o Nogueira Martins & Alessandro Turrini, 2007. "From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 53(1), pages 115-152, March.
    4. Buti, M. & Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Franco, D., 2005. "The Stability pact Pains : A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate," Discussion Paper 2005-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Lars Jonung & Martin Larch, 2006. "Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(47), pages 491-534, 07.
    6. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco & Stefania Zotteri, 2006. "EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 63-87, June.
    7. Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," European Economy - Economic Papers 180, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    8. Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, 2002. "Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(5), pages 823-848, December.
    9. Martin Larch & Matteo Salto, 2005. "Fiscal rules, inertia and discretionary fiscal policy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1135-1146.
    10. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/42, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    12. Marco Buti & Lucio R. Pench, 2004. "Why Do Large Countries Flout the Stability Pact? And What Can Be Done About It?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 1025-1032, December.
    13. Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Fiscal Policy In Good Times And Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1399-1436, November.
    14. Vincent Koen & Paul van den Noord, 2005. "Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and Creative Accounting," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 417, OECD Publishing.
    15. Marco Buti & Paul Noord, 2004. "Fiscal Discretion and Elections in the Early Years of EMU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 737-756, November.
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