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Társadalmi bizalom és költségvetési hiány
[Social confidence and budget deficit]

Author

Listed:
  • Győrffy, Dóra

Abstract

A tanulmány azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy az államba vetett bizalom hogyan befolyásolja a költségvetési egyensúly létrejöttét és fennmaradását. Fő tézise, hogy azokban az országokban, ahol alacsony a társadalomnak a politikai rendszerbe vetett bizalma, a költségvetés bevételi és kiadási oldala is hozzájárul a hiány kialakulásához: a bevételi oldalon a nagyobb az adócsalásra való hajlam, míg a kiadási oldalon a populista politikára való kísértés, valamint a strukturális reformokhoz szükséges konszenzus kialakításának nehézsége növeli az egyensúlytalanságot. A bizalom és a költségvetési egyensúly közti pozitív kapcsolatot a cikk egyrészt az eurózóna eddigi tapasztalatainak statisztikai elemzése, másrészt Svédország és Magyarország - az 1990-es évek közepén megtörtént - konszolidációjának kvalitatív összehasonlítása révén mutatja be. A bizalom és egyensúly kapcsolatának felismeréséből adódó fő következtetés, hogy alacsony bizalmi környezetben a tartósan kiegyensúlyozott költségvetés esélye csekély, és helyette a túlköltekezés-megszorítások ciklusainak váltakozása valószínűsíthető. Journal of Economics Literature (JEL) kód: H26, H30, H62, P16.

Suggested Citation

  • Győrffy, Dóra, 2007. "Társadalmi bizalom és költségvetési hiány [Social confidence and budget deficit]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 274-290.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:903
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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