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Do Stock Markets Discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just Monitoring, or also In?uencing?

  • L. BAELE
  • V. DE BRUYCKERE
  • O. DE JONGHE

    ()

  • R. VANDER VENNET

This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar business model characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics (using respectively a stochastic frontier and multiplicative heteroscedasticity model). We show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization. Next, we show, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long- term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market in?uencing. Finally, we show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect in?uencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, or wholesale depositors.

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Paper provided by Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium with number 12/827.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:12/827
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