IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fednsr/293.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public disclosure and risk-adjusted performance at bank holding companies

Author

Listed:
  • Beverly Hirtle

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the amount of information disclosed by bank holding companies (BHCs) and their subsequent risk-adjusted performance. Using data from the annual reports of BHCs with large trading operations, we construct an index of publicly disclosed information about the BHCs? forward-looking estimates of market risk exposure in their trading and market-making activities. The paper then examines the relationship between this index and subsequent risk-adjusted returns in the BHCs? trading activities and for the firm overall. The key finding is that more disclosure is associated with higher risk-adjusted returns. This result is strongest for BHCs where trading represents a large share of overall firm activity. More disclosure does not appear to be associated with higher risk-adjusted performance during the financial crisis, however, suggesting that the findings are a ?business as usual? phenomenon. These findings suggest that greater disclosure is associated with more efficient risk-taking and thus improved risk-return tradeoffs, a channel for market discipline that has not been emphasized previously in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Beverly Hirtle, 2007. "Public disclosure and risk-adjusted performance at bank holding companies," Staff Reports 293, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:293
    Note: Previous title: “Public Disclosure, Risk, and Performance at Bank Holding Companies”
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr293.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr293.html
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ursel Baumann & Erlend Nier, 2004. "Disclosure, volatility, and transparency: and empirical investigation into the value of bank disclosure," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 31-45.
    2. Jeremy Berkowitz & James O'Brien, 2002. "How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at Commercial Banks?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1093-1111, June.
    3. Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
    4. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771.
    5. Flannery, Mark J. & Kwan, Simon H. & Nimalendran, M., 2004. "Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 419-460, March.
    6. Joao A. C. Santos, 2014. "Evidence from the bond market on banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” subsidy," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 29-39.
    7. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 73-92.
    8. Christine M. Cumming & Beverly Hirtle, 2001. "The challenges of risk management in diversified financial companies," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Mar, pages 1-17.
    9. Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, 1997. "Bank capital requirements for market risk: the internal models approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(Dec), pages 1-12.
    10. Simon H. Kwan, 2004. "Testing the strong-form of market discipline: the effects of public market signals on bank risk," Working Paper Series 2004-19, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    11. Leuz, C & Verrecchia, RE, 2000. "The economic consequences of increased disclosure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38, pages 91-124.
    12. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 362-377, February.
    13. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
    14. Goyal, Vidhan K., 2005. "Market discipline of bank risk: Evidence from subordinated debt contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 318-350, July.
    15. Beverly Hirtle, 2003. "What market risk capital reporting tells us about bank risk," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 37-54.
    16. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    17. Kevin Stiroh, 2006. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Bank Risk," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(3), pages 237-263, December.
    18. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2002. "Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 6(3), pages 361-396.
    19. Bushee, BJ & Noe, CF, 2000. "Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38, pages 171-202.
    20. Barth, Mary E. & Konchitchki, Yaniv & Landsman, Wayne R., 2013. "Cost of capital and earnings transparency," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 206-224.
    21. Giuliano Iannotta, 2006. "Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(3), pages 287-309, December.
    22. Julapa Jagtiani & George Kaufman & Catharine Lemieux, 2002. "The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post‐FDICIA Period," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 559-575, December.
    23. Balasubramnian, Bhanu & Cyree, Ken B., 2011. "Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 21-35, January.
    24. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Malafronte, Irma & Porzio, Claudio & Starita, Maria Grazia, 2016. "The nature and determinants of disclosure practices in the insurance industry: Evidence from European insurers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 367-382.
    2. Frésard, Laurent & Pérignon, Christophe & Wilhelmsson, Anders, 2011. "The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 2569-2583, October.
    3. Dirk Höring & Helmut Gründl, 2011. "Investigating Risk Disclosure Practices in the European Insurance Industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 36(3), pages 380-413, July.
    4. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 362-377, February.
    5. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "Diversification and Value-at-Risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-66, January.
    6. Baele, Lieven & De Bruyckere, Valerie & De Jonghe, Olivier & Vander Vennet, Rudi, 2014. "Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring, or also influencing?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 124-145.
    7. Vander Vennet Rudi & De Jonghe Olivier & De Bruyckere Valerie & Baele Lieven, 2011. "Enhancing Bank Transparency: Risk Ineffciency as a Market Disciplining Mechanism," 2011 Meeting Papers 559, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4060 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    2. Niu, Jijun, 2008. "Can subordinated debt constrain banks' risk taking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1110-1119, June.
    3. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2013. "Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 693-706.
    4. Bennett, Rosalind L. & Hwa, Vivian & Kwast, Myron L., 2015. "Market discipline by bank creditors during the 2008–2010 crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 51-69.
    5. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2012. "Opaque banks, price discovery, and financial instability," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 383-408.
    6. Baele, Lieven & De Bruyckere, Valerie & De Jonghe, Olivier & Vander Vennet, Rudi, 2014. "Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring, or also influencing?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 124-145.
    7. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Liu, LiuLing & Wang, Haizhi, 2019. "Senior debt and market discipline: Evidence from bank-to-bank loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 170-182.
    8. Flannery, Mark J. & Kwan, Simon H. & Nimalendran, Mahendrarajah, 2013. "The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 55-84.
    9. Pop, Adrian, 2006. "Market discipline in international banking regulation: Keeping the playing field level," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 286-310, October.
    10. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike, 2014. "Disagreement between rating agencies and bond opacity: A theoretical perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 82-85.
    11. Dewally, Michaël & Shao, Yingying, 2013. "Financial derivatives, opacity, and crash risk: Evidence from large US banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 565-577.
    12. Kozubovska, Mariolia, 2017. "The effect of US bank holding companies’ exposure to asset-backed commercial paper conduits on the information opacity and systemic risk," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 530-545.
    13. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-53, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. Leung, W.S. & Taylor, N. & Evans, K.P., 2015. "The determinants of bank risks: Evidence from the recent financial crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 277-293.
    15. Selçuk Caner & Süheyla Özyıldırım & A. Ungan, 2012. "How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 42(3), pages 187-205, December.
    16. Guo, Lin & Prezas, Alexandros P., 2019. "Market monitoring and influence: evidence from deposit pricing and liability composition from 1986 to 2013," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 146-166.
    17. Randall Kroszner, 2016. "A Review of Bank Funding Cost Differentials," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 151-174, June.
    18. Westman, Hanna, 2014. "Crisis performance of European banks – does management ownership matter?," Research Discussion Papers 28/2014, Bank of Finland.
    19. Livne, Gilad & Markarian, Garen & Mironov, Maxim, 2013. "Investment horizon, risk, and compensation in the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3669-3680.
    20. Al-Hadi, Ahmed & Taylor, Grantley & Hossain, Mahmud, 2015. "Disaggregation, auditor conservatism and implied cost of equity capital: An international evidence from the GCC," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 66-98.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    value at risk; market discipline; disclosure; banking;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.