Testing Nash Bargaining Household Models With Time Series Data: Divorce Law Reform and Female Suicide in Canada
Recent literature surveys indicate the absence of definitive evidence distinguishing unitary from collective models of the household. In this paper, we exploit dramatic changes in divorce law legislation in Canada to test one variant of the collective approach, cooperative Nash bargained household models.
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