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Property Rights, Oil and Income Levels: Over a Century of Evidence

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  • Christa N. Brunnschweiler

    (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Simone Valente

    (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

We investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent regimes of control rights over oil exploitation on ag- gregate domestic income. We construct a new panel dataset on petroleum ownership struc- tures for up to 68 countries between 1867-2008, distinguishing among regimes of Domestic Control, Foreign Control, and international Partnerships. Results show that Partnerships tend to generate higher domestic income than Foreign and Domestic Control. This result is robust to controlling for political regimes (i.e. democracy, anocracy, autocracy), time e¤ects, and other factors. Existing theories of incomplete contracts capture several aspects, but not the general mechanism underlying the relationships between aggregate domestic income and control regimes in primary sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Simone Valente, 2013. "Property Rights, Oil and Income Levels: Over a Century of Evidence," Working Paper Series 15613, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
  • Handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:15613
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    Cited by:

    1. Brunnschweiler, Christa N. & Poelhekke, Steven, 2021. "Pushing one’s luck: Petroleum ownership and discoveries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    2. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2018. "Economic growth and property rights on natural resources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 423-482, March.
    3. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2018. "Economic growth and property rights on natural resources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 423-482, March.
    4. Iacono, Roberto, 2016. "No blessing, no curse? On the benefits of being a resource-rich southern region of Italy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 346-359.
    5. Tim Wegenast, 2016. "Oil, Natural Gas, and Intrastate Conflict: Does Ownership Matter?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 31-55, January.
    6. Khanna, Arpita Asha, 2017. "Revisiting the Oil Curse: Does Ownership Matter?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 214-229.
    7. Mohammad Kemal, 2016. "Ownership Rights versus Access Rights Allocation to Critical Resources: An Empirical Study of the Economic Impact of Changes in Oil Governance," Working Papers 2016-02, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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