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Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: a Cause Marketing Mobile Field Experiment

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  • Jean-Pierre Dubé
  • Xueming Luo
  • Zheng Fang

Abstract

We empirically test an information economics based theory of social preferences in which ego utility and self-signaling can potentially crowd out the effect of consumption utility on choices. Two large-scale, randomized controlled field experiments involving a consumer good and charitable donations are conducted using a subject pool of actual consumers. We find that bundling relatively large charitable donations with a consumer good can generate non-monotonic regions of demand. Consumers also self-report significantly lower ratings of “feeling good about themselves” when a large donation is bundled with a large price discount for the good. The combined evidence supports the self-signaling theory whereby price discounts crowd out a consumer’s self-inference of altruism from buying a good bundled with a charitable donation. Alternative theories of motivation crowding are unable to fit the non-monotonic moments in the data. A structural model of self-signaling is fit to the data to quantify the economic magnitude of ego utility and its role in driving consumer decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Dubé & Xueming Luo & Zheng Fang, 2015. "Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: a Cause Marketing Mobile Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 21475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21475
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    Cited by:

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    2. Soetevent, Adriaan R. & Bao, Te & Schippers, Anouk L., 2016. "A commercial gift for charity," Research Report 16002-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    3. Jibonayan Raychaudhuri & Ada Wossink, 2018. "Ecolabels and The Economic Recession," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1807, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Ali Rezaeian & Rouhollah Bagheri, 2018. "Modeling the Factors that Affect the Implementation of Knowledge Networks," Foresight and STI Governance (Foresight-Russia till No. 3/2015), National Research University Higher School of Economics, vol. 12(1), pages 56-67.
    5. Daniel W. Elfenbein & Raymond Fisman & Brian McManus, 2019. "Does Cheap Talk Affect Market Outcomes? Evidence from eBay," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 305-326, October.
    6. Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen & Tobias Gesche, 2016. "Persistent bias in advice-giving," ECON - Working Papers 228, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2017.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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