IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20160009.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Commercial Gift for Charity

Author

Listed:
  • Adriaan R. Soetevent

    (University of Groningen, the Netherlands)

  • Te Bao

    (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)

  • Anouk L. Schippers

    (University of Groningen, the Netherlands)

Abstract

Commercial firms are increasingly tying the sales of their products with donations to a charitable cause. Apart from a charitable motive, offering these charity-linked bundles could be a strategic instrument for firms to increase profits. We report the results of an experiment that investigates for different of these schemes whether they are able to increase profits net of the donation, and which donation scheme is most profitable. From a theoretical perspective, given rational agents, complete markets, and absent transaction cost, selling charity-linked bundles should not be profitable even when consumers are altruistic. We find however that sellers who donate 5% of their gross revenues or an equivalent absolute amount do attain significantly higher profits. No such effect is observed when the donation is limited to 2%. Offering charity-linked bundles considerably crowds out private donations by buyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriaan R. Soetevent & Te Bao & Anouk L. Schippers, 2016. "A Commercial Gift for Charity," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-009/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/16009.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crumpler, Heidi & Grossman, Philip J., 2008. "An experimental test of warm glow giving," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1011-1021, June.
    2. Bruttel, Lisa V., 2009. "Group dynamics in experimental studies--The Bertrand Paradox revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 51-63, January.
    3. Boone, Jan & Larraín Aylwin, María Jose & Müller, Wieland & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2012. "Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 134-137.
    4. Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1992. "Introduction to Experimental Economics," Introductory Chapters,in: Experimental Economics Princeton University Press.
    5. Imas, Alex, 2014. "Working for the “warm glow”: On the benefits and limits of prosocial incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 14-18.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market competition; Firm behavior; Charity-linked bundling; Charitable giving; Cause marketing;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.