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No excuses for good behavior: Volunteering and the social environment

  • Linardi, Sera
  • McConnell, Margaret A.

We study the effect of the social environment on the quantity and quality of voluntary labor contributions. By extending Benabou and Tirole's (2006) image signaling framework, we derive theoretical predictions on time volunteered given (1) the availability of excuses to stop volunteering and (2) the presence of an authority figure. We test these predictions in an experiment where laboratory subjects are directly involved in a local nonprofit operation. We find that in the absence of excuses to stop volunteering, subjects volunteer longer without working less productively. This increase is partially driven by subjects' reluctance to be the first to stop volunteering. The presence of an authority figure has little impact, but the presence of peers has a positive and significant impact.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 95 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5-6 (June)
Pages: 445-454

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:5-6:p:445-454
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  19. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Myers, Caitlin Knowles, 2007. "Why Volunteer? Evidence on the Role of Altruism, Reputation, and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 3021, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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