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Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: Evidence based on a new credibility index

Author

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  • Grégory Levieuge
  • Yannick Lucotte
  • Sébastien Ringuedé

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and the volatility of the key monetary policy instrument. Two main contributions are proposed. First, we propose a time-varying measure of central bank credibility based on the gap between inflation expectations and the official inflation target. While this new index addresses the main limitations of the existing indicators, it also appears particularly suited to assess the monetary experiences of a large sample of inflation-targeting emerging countries. Second, by means of EGARCH estimations, we formally prove the existence of a negative effect of credibility on the volatility of the short-term interest rate. Thus, in line with the expectations channel of monetary policy, the higher the credibility of the central bank, the lower the need to move its instruments to efficiently fulfill its objective.

Suggested Citation

  • Grégory Levieuge & Yannick Lucotte & Sébastien Ringuedé, 2015. "Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: Evidence based on a new credibility index," NBP Working Papers 209, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Bomfim, Antulio N & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 2000. "Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 707-721, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:taf:apeclt:v:25:y:2018:i:4:p:278-282 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lukáš Kučera, 2016. "Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy: A Broader View," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2016(4), pages 59-70.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credibility; Inflation targeting; Emerging countries; EGARCH; Expectations;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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