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Capital Requirements, Risk Taking and Welfare in a Growing Economy

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  • Pierre-Richard Agénor
  • L. Pereira da Silva

Abstract

The effects of capital requirements on risk taking and welfare are studied in a stochastic overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking, limited liability, and government guarantees. Capital producers face a choice between a safe technology and a risky (but socially inefficient) technology, and bank risk taking is endogenous. Setting the capital adequacy ratio above a structural threshold can eliminate the equilibrium with risky loans (and thus inefficient risk taking), but numerical simulations show that this may entail a welfare loss. In addition, the optimal ratio may be too high in practice and may require concomitantly a broadening of the perimeter of regulation and a strengthening of financial supervision to prevent disintermediation and distortions in financial markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Richard Agénor & L. Pereira da Silva, 2016. "Capital Requirements, Risk Taking and Welfare in a Growing Economy," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 226, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:226
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    Cited by:

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    2. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Leonardo Gambacorta & Enisse Kharroubi & Enisse Kharroubi, 2018. "The effects of prudential regulation, financial development and financial openness on economic growth," BIS Working Papers 752, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Luan, Fushu & Chen, Yang & Lang, Lin & Lim, King Yoong, 2025. "Banking prudentials, leverage, and innovation partnership choice in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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