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Bank leverage, credit traps and credit policies

Author

Listed:
  • Foulis, Angus

    (Bank of England)

  • Nelson, Benjamin

    (Bank of England)

  • Tanaka, Misa

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

We construct an overlapping generations macroeconomic model with which to study the causes, consequences and remedies to ‘credit traps’ — prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalisation, and the misallocation of credit. In our model, credit traps arise when shocks to bank equity capital tighten banks’ borrowing constraints, causing them to allocate credit to easily collateralisable but low productivity projects. Low productivity weakens bank capital generation, reinforcing tight borrowing constraints, sustaining the credit trap steady state. We use the model to study policy options, both ex ante(avoiding credit traps) and ex post (escaping them). Ex ante, restrictions on bank leverage can help to enhance the economy’s resilience to the shocks that can cause credit traps. Further, a policymaker focused on maximising the economy’s resilience to credit traps would set leverage countercyclically, allowing an expansion of leverage in minor downturns and reducing leverage in upswings. However, ex post, relaxing a leverage cap will not help escape the trap. Instead, a range of unconventional policies are needed. We study publicly intermediated lending, discount window lending, and recapitalisation, and compare the efficacy of these policies under different conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Foulis, Angus & Nelson, Benjamin & Tanaka, Misa, 2015. "Bank leverage, credit traps and credit policies," Bank of England working papers 539, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:0539
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2021. "Capital requirements, risk-taking and welfare in a growing economy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 167-192, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unconventional credit policy; leverage regulation; financial intermediation; financial crisis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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