IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies

  • Collard, F.
  • Dellas, H.
  • Diba, B.
  • Loisel, O.

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the interconnectedness between macroeconomic and financial stability and has raised the question of whether and how to combine the corresponding main policy instruments (interest rate and bank-capital requirements). This paper offers a characterization of the jointly optimal setting of monetary and prudential policies and discusses its implications for the business cycle. The source of financial fragility is the socially excessive risk-taking by banks due to limited liability and deposit insurance. We characterize the conditions under which locally optimal (Ramsey) policy dedicates the prudential instrument to preventing inefficient risk-taking by banks; and the monetary instrument to dealing with the business cycle, with the two instruments co-varying negatively. Our analysis thus identifies circumstances that can validate the prevailing view among central bankers that standard interest-rate policy cannot serve as the first line of defense against financial instability. In addition, we also provide conditions under which the two instruments might optimally co-move positively and countercyclically.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 413.

in new window

Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:413
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS

Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Vasco Cúrdia & Michael Woodford, 2010. "Conventional and unconventional monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 229-264.
  2. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," Working Paper Series WP10-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  3. Noah Williams & Andrew Levin & Alexei Onatski, 2005. "Monetary Policy under Uncertainty in Micro-Founded Macroeconometric Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 478, Society for Computational Economics.
  4. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes," NBER Working Papers 16091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Ruud de Mooij & M.P. Devereux, 2009. "An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reform in the EU," CPB Discussion Paper 128, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  6. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Marion Kohler, 2014. "When Capital Adequacy and Interest Rate Policy Are Substitutes (And When They Are Not)," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(3), pages 205-231, September.
  7. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
  8. Ian Christensen & Césaire Meh & Kevin Moran, 2011. "Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics," Cahiers de recherche 1140, CIRPEE.
  9. Jermann, Urban & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2009. "Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7451, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Javier Bianchi, 2010. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," 2010 Meeting Papers 96, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Olivier J Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/03, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Christopher Otrok & Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2012. "Monetary and Macro-Prudential Policies: An Integrated Analysis," Working Papers 1208, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  13. Canuto, Otaviano, 2011. "How Complementary Are Prudential Regulation and Monetary Policy?," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 60, pages 1-7, June.
  14. David Lopez-Salido & Andrew T. Levin, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Capital Accumulation," 2004 Meeting Papers 826, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Borio, Claudio & Zhu, Haibin, 2012. "Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 236-251.
  16. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2005. "The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements," 2005 Meeting Papers 880, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Martinez-Miera, David & Suarez, Javier, 2012. "A Macroeconomic Model of Endogenous Systemic Risk Taking," CEPR Discussion Papers 9134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Angeloni, Ignazio & Faia, Ester, 2013. "Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 311-324.
  19. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2010. "Procyclicality of Capital Requirements in a General Equilibrium Model of Liquidity Dependence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 137-173, December.
  20. repec:fip:fedgsq:y:2010:i:oct11 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Janet L Yellen, 2011. "Macroprudential Supervision and Monetary Policy in the Post-crisis World," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 46(1), pages 3-12, January.
  22. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2012. "Erratum: Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1186-1186, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:413. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael brassart)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.