IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/man/cgbcrp/218.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Growth and Welfare Effects of Macroprudential Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Richard Agénor

Abstract

This paper studies the growth and welfare effects of macroprudential regulation in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking and agency costs. Indivisible investment projects combine with informational imperfections to create a double moral hazard problem à la Holmström-Tirole and a role for bank monitoring. When the optimal monitoring intensity is endogenously determined, an increase in the required reserve ratio (motivated by systemic risk considerations) has conflicting effects on investment and growth. On the one hand, requiring banks to put away a fraction of the deposits that they receive reduces the supply of loanable funds. On the other, a higher required ratio raises incentives to save and mitigates banks' incentives to monitor, thereby lowering monitoring costs and freeing up resources to increase lending. In addition, it may mitigate the systemic risk externality associated with excessive leverage. This trade-off can be internalized by choosing the required reserve ratio that maximizes growth and welfare. However, the risk of disintermediation means that in practice financial supervision may also need to be strengthened, and the perimeter of regulation broadened, if the optimal ratio is relatively high.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Richard Agénor, 2016. "Growth and Welfare Effects of Macroprudential Regulation," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 218, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  • Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:218
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/cgbcr/discussionpapers/dpcgbcr218.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 237-254, December.
    2. Van den Heuvel, Skander J., 2008. "The welfare cost of bank capital requirements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 298-320, March.
    3. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    4. Chakraborty, Shankha & Ray, Tridip, 2006. "Bank-based versus market-based financial systems: A growth-theoretic analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 329-350, March.
    5. Babajide Fowowe, 2013. "Financial Liberalization In Sub-Saharan Africa: What Do We Know?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, February.
    6. Barnea, Emanuel & Landskroner, Yoram & Sokoler, Meir, 2015. "Monetary policy and financial stability in a banking economy: Transmission mechanism and policy tradeoffs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 78-90.
    7. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Mark G. Guzman & Elisabeth Huybens & Bruce D. Smith, 1995. "Monetary, Fiscal, and Bank Regulatory Policy in a Simple Monetary Growth Model," Working Papers 9501, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    9. Bhattacharya, Joydeep, et al, 1997. "Monetary, Fiscal, and Reserve Requirement Policy in a Simple Monetary Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 321-350, May.
    10. Giovanni Favara, 2012. "Agency Problems and Endogenous Investment Fluctuations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2301-2342.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marianne Sensier). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/semanuk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.