Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy
We study three corporate nonmarket strategies designed to influence the lobbying behavior of other special interest groups: (1) astroturf, in which the firm covertly subsidizes a group with similiar views to lobby when it normally would not; (2) the bear hug, in which the firm overtly pays a group to alter its lobbying activitives; and (3) self-regulation, in which the firm voluntarily limits the potential social harm from its activities. All three strategies reduce the informativeness of lobbying, and all reduce the payoff of the public decision-maker. We show that the decision-maker would benefit by requiring the public disclosure of funds but that the availability of alternative strategies limits the impact of such a policy.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004|
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