IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The economic analysis of voluntary approaches to environmental protection. A survey

  • R. Brau

    ()

  • C. Carraro

This paper surveys the recent literature on voluntary (or negotiated) approaches as an environmental policy tool. Rather than adopting a positive perspective and describing different types of voluntary approaches (VAs) and their main features or their pros and cons, this survey focuses on the economic incentives for firms or industries to adopt VAs. The consequent role that VAs may play within a set of policy tools designed to address environmental problems is then assessed. A careful understanding of the economic incentives that induce a firm to sign a VA is indeed crucial to identify and design the policy mix that makes the VA both environmentally effective and economically efficient.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/node/218
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?file=http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/default/files/wp/04-20.pdf&nid=218
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 200420.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200420
Contact details of provider: Postal: Via S. Giorgio 12, I-09124 Cagliari
Phone: +70/6756406
Fax: +70/6756402
Web page: http://www.crenos.unica.it/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1999. "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 158-175, September.
  2. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2002. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 113-134, January.
  3. Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(1), pages 97-114.
  4. Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, 1992. "Environmental innovation policy and international competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 183-200, March.
  5. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
  6. Konar, Shameek & Cohen, Mark A., 1997. "Information As Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 109-124, January.
  7. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2003. "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2725-2736, December.
  8. Alberto Cavaliere, 2000. "Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 195-202, October.
  9. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(4), pages 413-432.
  10. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  11. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
  12. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscaico, Domenico, 1994. "Environmental policy reconsidered: The role of technological innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 545-554, April.
  13. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  14. J Videras & A Alberini, 2000. "The appeal of voluntary environmental programs: which firms participate and why?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(4), pages 449-460, October.
  15. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
  16. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
  17. R. Brau & C. Carraro, 2009. "The Design of Voluntary Agreements in Oligopolistic Markets," Working Paper CRENoS 200907, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  18. Kuhn, Michael, 1999. "Green Lemons - Environmental Labels and Entry into an Environmentally Differentiated Market under Asymmetric Information," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 20, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  19. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
  20. Khanna, Madhu, 2001. " Non-mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 291-324, July.
  21. Khanna, Madhu & Damon, Lisa A., 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, January.
  22. Hansen, Lars Gårn, 1997. "Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements," MPRA Paper 47537, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
  23. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
  24. Tran Huu Dung, 1993. "Optimal Taxation and Heterogeneous Oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(4), pages 933-47, November.
  25. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, 2001. "Does The Market Value Environmental Performance?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 281-289, May.
  26. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
  27. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, 09.
  28. Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean TIROLE, 1990. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making : a Theory of Regulatory Capture," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9004, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  29. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J., . "On the stability of collusion," CORE Discussion Papers RP -702, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  30. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  31. Blackman, Allen & Boyd, James, 1999. "Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Performance Standards Necessarily Improve Welfare?," Discussion Papers dp-00-03-rev, Resources For the Future.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200420. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antonello Pau)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.