Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements
Voluntary agreements with industry offer many examplesof overcompliance with respect to environmentalstandards. Such phenomena seem to be irrational butappear less surprising considering firms' strategiesare aimed to internalise environmental quality. Wemodel the choice of the environmental quality ofproducts in a one-shot game between a monopolist andconsumers, to show the existence of inefficientequilibria where quality is low because of moralhazard. The firm can, however, change its' equilibriumstrategy in a repeated but finite game, in order tobuild an environmental reputation if we suppose thatconsumers' information is not only imperfect withregard to quality, but also incomplete with respect toany environmental constraint that may affect thebehaviour of firms (like the threat either of astricter regulation or of potential entry). In atwo-period model, we show the existence of a perfectBayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies where thefirm can revert to the production of green products inorder to influence consumers' beliefs and acquire anenvironmentally friendly reputation. Due to thepeculiarity of environmental information (greenproducts are credence goods), we claim that anexplicit agreement is also necessary in order toestablish monitoring and controlling procedures toverify the performance of firms. These procedures canexplain per se the diffusion of voluntary agreementsthat are nevertheless self-enforcing because of thereputation effect. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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