The Choice of Management Practices: What Determines the Design of an Environmental Management System?
This paper examines whether differential incentives exist in the adoption of environmental management practices (EMPs) with varying features that often make up the design of environmental management systems implemented by firms. Estimation of multivariate probit models reveals that greater consumer, regulatory and investor pressures are positively related to the adoption of EMPs that directly enhance a firm's green image. In addition, potential liability costs are positively associated with adopting broad-based EMPs while regulatory pressures are not generally found to have any significant relationship with environmental efforts that improve and address compliance issues. Results also reveal that competitive pressures arising from environmental efforts by rival firms creates stronger incentives for environmental self-regulation than any pressures arising from potential regulatory threats at the industry level.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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