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What Drives Voluntary Eco-Certification in Mexico?

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  • Blackman, Allen

    () (Resources for the Future)

  • Guerrero, Santiago

Abstract

Advocates claim that voluntary programs can help shore up poorly performing command-and-control environmental regulation in developing countries. Although literature on this issue is quite thin, research on voluntary environmental programs in industrialized countries suggests that they are often ineffective because they mainly attract relatively clean plants free-riding on prior pollution control investments. We use plant-level data on some 59,000 facilities to identify the drivers of participation in the ISO 14001 certification program in Mexico. We find that regulatory fines spur certification: on average, a fine roughly doubles the likelihood of certification for three years. Hence, the program attracts dirty firms and at least has the potential to improve environmental performance. We also find that plants that sold their goods in overseas markets, used imported inputs, were relatively large, and were in certain sectors and states were more likely to be certified.

Suggested Citation

  • Blackman, Allen & Guerrero, Santiago, 2010. "What Drives Voluntary Eco-Certification in Mexico?," Discussion Papers dp-10-26, Resources For the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Blackman, Allen & Lahiri, Bidisha & Pizer, William & Rivera Planter, Marisol & Muñoz Piña, Carlos, 2010. "Voluntary environmental regulation in developing countries: Mexico's Clean Industry Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 182-192, November.
    2. Carlson, Anna & Palmer, Charles, 2016. "A qualitative meta-synthesis of the benefits of eco-labeling in developing countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 129-145.
    3. Alonso-Paulí, Eduard & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 85-106.
    4. Allen Blackman, 2012. "Does eco-certification boost regulatory compliance in developing countries? ISO 14001 in Mexico," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 242-263, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voluntary environmental regulation; duration analysis; Mexico;

    JEL classification:

    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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