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What Drives Participation in State Voluntary Cleanup Programs? Evidence from Oregon

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  • Blackman, Allen

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Lyon, Thomas P.
  • Wernstedt, Kris
  • Darley, Sarah

Abstract

Virtually all U.S. states have now created voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) offering liability relief and other incentives for responsible parties to remediate contaminated sites. We use a duration model to analyze participation in Oregon’s program. In contrast to previous VCP research, we find that this program attracts sites with significant contamination, not just relatively clean ones. Furthermore, we find that regulatory pressure—in particular, the public listing of contaminated sites—drives participation. These findings imply Oregon has been able to spur voluntary remediation via public disclosure, a result that comports with key themes in the literature on voluntary environmental regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Blackman, Allen & Lyon, Thomas P. & Wernstedt, Kris & Darley, Sarah, 2008. "What Drives Participation in State Voluntary Cleanup Programs? Evidence from Oregon," RFF Working Paper Series dp-08-04, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matsumoto, Shigeru, 2011. "A duration analysis of environmental alternative dispute resolution in Japan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 659-666, February.
    2. Michael Trouw & Stephan Weiler & Jesse Silverstein, 2020. "Brownfield Development: Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Premia," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-18, March.
    3. Rasha Ahmed, 2012. "Promoting energy-efficient products: voluntary or regulatory approaches?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(3), pages 303-321, July.
    4. Linn, Joshua, 2013. "The effect of voluntary brownfields programs on nearby property values: Evidence from Illinois," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-18.
    5. Joaquin Ameller & Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Corinne Merly, 2020. "The contribution of economic science to brownfield redevelopment: a review," Post-Print hal-02532209, HAL.
    6. Shigeru Matsumoto & Takanori Ishii, 2013. "Order of occupancy in the settlement of pollution disputes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(3), pages 329-341, July.
    7. Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin & Allen Blackman & Kris Wernstedt, 2018. "Voluntary Cleanup Programs for Brownfield Sites: A Theoretical Analysis," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 297-322, June.
    8. Alberto Longo & Danny Campbell, 2017. "The Determinants of Brownfields Redevelopment in England," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 261-283, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    environment; hazardous waste; brownfields; contaminated property; duration analysis; Oregon;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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