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Comparing quality signals as tools of consumer protection: are warranties always better than advertisements to promote higher product quality?

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  • Noll, Juergen

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  • Noll, Juergen, 2004. "Comparing quality signals as tools of consumer protection: are warranties always better than advertisements to promote higher product quality?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 227-239, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:227-239
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shyh-Fang Ueng, 1997. "On economic incentive for quality upgrading," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 459-473.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    3. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. Juergen Noll, 2003. "Does One Size Fit All? A Note on the Harmonization of National Warranty Law as a Tool of Consumer Protection," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-231, September.
    6. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    7. Erevelles, Sunil & Roy, Abhik & Yip, Leslie S. C., 2001. "The universality of the signal theory for products and services," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 175-187, May.
    8. Alberto Cavaliere, 2000. "Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 195-202, October.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    10. Schlee, Edward E., 2001. "Buyer experimentation and introductory pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 347-362, March.
    11. Hjorth-Andersen, Chr., 1991. "Quality indicators : In theory and in fact," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1491-1505, December.
    12. Murthy, D. N. P. & Djamaludin, I., 2002. "New product warranty: A literature review," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 231-260, October.
    13. Hudson, John, 2000. "A Bayesian approach to the evaluation of stochastic signals of product quality," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 599-607, October.
    14. DeCroix, Gregory A., 1999. "Optimal warranties, reliabilities and prices for durable goods in an oligopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 554-569, February.
    15. Price, Lydia J. & Dawar, Niraj, 2002. "The joint effects of brands and warranties in signaling new product quality," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 165-190, April.
    16. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478.
    17. Jones, Philip & Hudson, John, 1996. "Signalling product quality: When is price relevant?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 257-266, August.
    18. Beales, Howard & Craswell, Richard & Salop, Steven C, 1981. "The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 491-539, December.
    19. Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
    20. Nathalie Chappe, 2002. "The Informational Role of the Arbitration Clause," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-34, January.
    21. Boulding, William & Kirmani, Amna, 1993. "A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 20(1), pages 111-123, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shaosheng Jin & Rao Yuan & Yan Zhang & Xin Jin, 2019. "Chinese Consumers’ Preferences for Attributes of Fresh Milk: A Best–Worst Approach," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(21), pages 1-16, November.
    2. Prashant M. Ambad & Makarand S. Kulkarni, 2017. "A goal programming approach for multi-objective warranty optimization," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 8(4), pages 842-861, December.
    3. Jin, Yanhong H. & Lin, Liguo & Yao, Lan, 2011. "Do Consumers Trust the National Inspection Exemption Brands? Evidence from Infant Formula in China," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103766, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Juan Prieto-Rodriguez & Manuel Gonzalez-Díaz, 2008. "Is There an Economic Rent for Island Hotels?," Tourism Economics, , vol. 14(1), pages 131-154, March.

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