IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v13y2002i1p27-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Informational Role of the Arbitration Clause

Author

Listed:
  • Nathalie Chappe

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathalie Chappe, 2002. "The Informational Role of the Arbitration Clause," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-34, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:13:y:2002:i:1:p:27-34
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1013109824184
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1013109824184
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1013109824184?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    3. Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 509-528, Fall.
    4. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Noll, Juergen, 2004. "Comparing quality signals as tools of consumer protection: are warranties always better than advertisements to promote higher product quality?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 227-239, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619.
    2. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2014. "Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 127-143.
    3. Wang, Fa & Chen, Jing & Yang, Hui & Yu, Bo, 2022. "Supplier selection with information disclosure in the presence of uninformed consumers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
    4. Soudipta Chakraborty & Robert Swinney, 2021. "Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(1), pages 155-169, 1-2.
    5. Arthur Campbell & C. Matthew Leister & Yves Zenou, 2020. "Word‐of‐mouth communication and search," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 676-712, September.
    6. Sawoong Kang, 2006. "Return Policy as a Signaling Device in Horizontally Differentiated Products," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 22, pages 409-436.
    7. Philippe Masset & Jean‐Philippe Weisskopf, 2022. "At what price should Bordeaux wines be released?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 392-412, January.
    8. Kenneth S. Corts, 2013. "Prohibitions on False and Unsubstantiated Claims: Inducing the Acquisition and Revelation of Information through Competition Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 453-486.
    9. Zhang, Juan & Huang, Jian, 2020. "Deceptive advertising in a crowdfunding market," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    10. Daniel W. Elfenbein & Raymond Fisman & Brian McManus, 2015. "Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 83-108, November.
    11. Cornago, Elisabetta & Dressler, Luisa, 2020. "Incentives to (not) disclose energy performance information in the housing market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    12. Donald A R George, 2014. "Segmentation in Consumer Durables Markets," International Journal of Business Administration, International Journal of Business Administration, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(2), pages 13-22, March.
    13. Noll, Juergen, 2004. "Comparing quality signals as tools of consumer protection: are warranties always better than advertisements to promote higher product quality?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 227-239, June.
    14. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    15. Farhad Sadeh & Manish Kacker, 2018. "Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 729-748, April.
    16. Chauhan, Yogesh & Kumar, Surya B., 2018. "Do investors value the nonfinancial disclosure in emerging markets?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 32-46.
    17. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato & John A. List, 2010. "That’S News To Me! Information Revelation In Professional Certification Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 104-122, January.
    18. Villas-Boas, Sofia B, 2020. "Reduced Form Evidence on Belief Updating Under Asymmetric Information," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt08c456vk, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    19. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2017. "Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 242-274, February.
    20. Haisken-DeNew, John & Hasan, Syed & Jha, Nikhil & Sinning, Mathias, 2018. "Unawareness and selective disclosure: The effect of school quality information on property prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 449-464.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:13:y:2002:i:1:p:27-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.