Incentives to (not) Disclose Energy Performance Information in the Housing Market
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More about this item
KeywordsInformation Unraveling; Voluntary Information Disclosure; Asymmetric;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ENE-2018-12-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-REG-2018-12-03 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2018-12-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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