The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations
This paper is concerned with policies for the supply of public, environmental goods from the farm sector. In particular, we characterize the buying of these goods by the public from farmers using the "Provider Gets Principle." This principle is well established in OECD countries, as we demonstrate. Results from ecological-economic modeling of the conservation of heather moorland in northern Scotland, using this principle, are described. This model enables us to identify spatially differentiated ecological targets, and to calculate the minimum necessary payments needed to achieve these targets.
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