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Strategic Environmental and Trade Policies with Corporate Environmentalism

  • Jinji, Naoto

The effects of corporate environmentalism are examined in the framework of strategic environmental and trade policies. An environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit-maximizing foreign firm in a third-country market. When emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, the presence of an environmentally conscious firm does not improve domestic welfare. Such a presence reduces domestic welfare when there is transboundary pollution and strong environmental consciousness. When only emission taxes are available, welfare may fall even if pollution is local. When only export subsidies are available, the presence of an environmentally conscious firm may improve domestic welfare.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/16963/1/070econDP04-10.pdf
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Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2004-10.

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Length: 28 p.
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2004-10
Contact details of provider: Phone: +81-42-580-8000
Web page: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/

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  4. Nakamura, Masao & Takahashi, Takuya & Vertinsky, Ilan, 2001. "Why Japanese Firms Choose to Certify: A Study of Managerial Responses to Environmental Issues," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 23-52, July.
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  8. Lyon,Thomas P. & Maxwell,John W., 2004. "Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521603768, May.
  9. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
  10. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
  11. Burguet, Roberto & Sempere, Jaume, 2003. "Trade liberalization, environmental policy, and welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-37, July.
  12. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 2001. "Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 107-128, June.
  13. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  15. Henriques, Irene & Sadorsky, Perry, 1996. "The Determinants of an Environmentally Responsive Firm: An Empirical Approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 381-395, May.
  16. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
  17. Walz, Uwe & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1997. "Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 275-291, November.
  18. Klaus Conrad, 2001. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 361-381, August.
  19. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
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