IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition

  • Georges Tanguay

    ()

Registered author(s):

    This paper examines the welfare implications of trade liberalization when governments behave strategically using pollution taxes and tariffs on imports. This competition leads to inefficiencies as each government seeks foreign rent and tries to transfer pollution to the other country. It is shown that banning tariffs leads to a higher level of pollution which decreases total welfare compared to the one obtained under restricted trade. As the rate of transboundary pollution transmission rises, the pollution-shifting motive is reduced and this leads to a too high pollution level. This problem is amplified when tariffs aren't available to governments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1012899411982
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 5 (November)
    Pages: 793-811

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:5:p:793-811
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Low, P., 1992. "International Trade and the Environment," World Bank - Discussion Papers 159, World Bank.
    2. Revesz, Richard L. & Stavins, Robert N., 2007. "Environmental Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    3. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Walz, Uwe & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1997. "Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 275-291, November.
    5. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Dean, Judith M., 1992. "Trade and the environment : a survey of the literature," Policy Research Working Paper Series 966, The World Bank.
    7. Georges A. Tanguay & Nicolas Marceau, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Taxation of Mobile Polluting Firms," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 122, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
    8. Rauscher, Michael, 1994. "On Ecological Dumping," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 822-40, Supplemen.
    9. Brander, James A., 1981. "Intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
    10. Kennedy Peter W., 1994. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-63, July.
    11. Hoel, Michael, 1997. " Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 241-59, June.
    12. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:5:p:793-811. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.