Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition
This paper examines the welfare implications of trade liberalization when governments behave strategically using pollution taxes and tariffs on imports. This competition leads to inefficiencies as each government seeks foreign rent and tries to transfer pollution to the other country. It is shown that banning tariffs leads to a higher level of pollution which decreases total welfare compared to the one obtained under restricted trade. As the rate of transboundary pollution transmission rises, the pollution-shifting motive is reduced and this leads to a too high pollution level. This problem is amplified when tariffs aren't available to governments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988.
"The Theory of Environmental Policy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311120, 1.
- James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983.
"A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980. "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade," Working Papers 405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Walz, Uwe & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1997. "Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 275-291, November.
- Dean, Judith M., 1992. "Trade and the environment : a survey of the literature," Policy Research Working Paper Series 966, The World Bank.
- Tanguay, Georges A. & Marceau, Nicolas, 2001.
"Centralized versus decentralized taxation of mobile polluting firms,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 327-341, October.
- Georges A. Tanguay & Nicolas Marceau, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Taxation of Mobile Polluting Firms," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 122, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Low, P., 1992. "International Trade and the Environment," World Bank - Discussion Papers 159, World Bank.
- Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
- James Brander, 1980.
"Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities,"
380, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Revesz, Richard L. & Stavins, Robert N., 2007. "Environmental Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
- Rauscher, Michael, 1994. "On Ecological Dumping," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 822-40, Supplemen.
- Hoel, Michael, 1997. " Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 241-59, June.
- Kennedy Peter W., 1994. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-63, July.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984.
"Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
NBER Working Papers
1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:5:p:793-811. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.