Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials in Open Economies under Emissions Constraints
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- Cees A. Withagen & Raymond J.G.M. Florax & Abay Mulatu, 2007. "Optimal environmental policy differentials in open economies under emissions constraints," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0701, Economics, The University of Manchester.
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More about this item
Keywordsecological dumping; general equilibrium; emission constraint; Kyoto Protocol; Porter hypothesis; D6; F12; Q28;
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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