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Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns

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  • Swank, Otto H.

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  • Swank, Otto H., 2000. "Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 257-271, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:257-271
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lupia, Arthur & McCubbins, Mathew D, 1994. "Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 96-125, April.
    2. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
    3. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    4. Letterie, Wilko & Swank, Otto H, 1997. "Learning and Signalling by Advisor Selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 353-367, September.
    5. Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    6. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    7. Bawn, Kathleen, 1997. "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 101-126, April.
    8. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    10. Swank, Otto H & Letterie, Wilko & van Dalen, Hendrik P, 1999. "A Theory of Policy Advice," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 602-614, October.
    11. Bendor, Jonathan & Taylor, Serge & Gaalen, Roland Van, 1985. "Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1041-1060, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2013. "Fiscal restraints by advisors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-232, August.
    3. Swank Otto H., 2000. "Seeking information: the role of information providers in the policy decision process," Public Economics 0004004, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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